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INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE OR INAPPOSITE
SOLICITUDE?
David L. Ratnert
In the most recent issue of the Quarterly, there appears a provocative
article by one Alfred Avins1 concerning the background and meaning of
the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. To
relate his topic to a significant question of current legal policy, the author
makes reference to the conflict-a conflict which has "surprisingly"'
been observed only by himself and one particularly "perceptive jurist"s
on the Washington State Supreme Court-between the thirteenth amend-
ment prohibition of involuntary servitude and state laws forbidding dis-
crimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin in "places of
public accommodation."
Mr. Avins tells us first that "most states include in the definition of
'places of public accommodation' one or more forms of personal service
occupations."' How an occupation can be a place is not made clear;
however, the concept of "place" is not helpful to Mr. Avins' argument
and it does not reappear. It is the "personal service occupations" to
which the statutes are supposedly applied that bothers him, and "the
personal service most often singled out is barbering. ' 5 "Typical" of the
barbering cases, he says, is that of Mustachio, a barber of Nassau
County.6 Mustachio, it appears:
[H]ad attempted to discourage Negro patronage of his barber shop by
posting a sign saying: "Kinky Haircut-$5" and by attempting to charge
a Negro that price, which the [New York State] Commission [Against
Discrimination] found was a "prohibitive price far in excess of respond-
ent's usual charge for cutting a white person's hair." [The Commission]
. . . ordered, inter alia, that the respondent barber write to the com-
plainant "offering to cut her son's hair at the regular rate charged by
respondent for cutting a white person's hair." It also ordered him to
"furnish to Negro customers services of the same quality as those furnished
to white customers at the same rates."17
"The intent of this order," says Mr. Avins, "is clear."
It requires the respondent, a barber, to work for a person and a group
of persons whom he clearly does not want to work for, upon pain of im-
" A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1 Avins, "Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment
Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation," 49 Cornell L.Q. 228 (1964).
2 Id. at 229.
3 Id. at 255.
4 Id. at 228.
5 Ibid.
6 State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Mustachio, 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 355 (1961).
7 Avis, supra note 1, at 229. [Emphasis in original.]
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prisonment if he refuses to do so. He is thus required to serve, involun-
tarily, the complainant and other Negro applicants. A statute which re-
quires one person to render involuntary service to another immediately
raises the question of its constitutionality under the thirteenth amend-
ment. 8
That said, Mr. Avins forsakes the barber shop for the slave block, and
turns to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, there to commence his in-
quiries into the history and meaning of the words "involuntary servi-
tude."
Taking advantage of his field trip to the Northwest Territory, let us
return to Mustachio's barber shop and see whether the State Commis-
sion noticed anything that Mr. Avins may have overlooked. Among its
findings of fact were the following:
3. At all times mentioned herein, respondent, Angelo Mustachio, was and
he still is the proprietor of Angelo's Barber Shop, 523 Uniondale Avenue,
in the Village of Uniondale, County of Nassau, State of New York.
4. At all times mentioned herein, Angelo's Barber Shop was and it still
is a place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.
7. In mid-December 1958 or thereabouts, complainant took her son to
Angelo's Barber Shop for a haircut.
8. On that occasion, one of the barbers at Angelo's Barber Shop gave
complainant's son a haircut for 75 cents.
9. The barber who gave complainant's son a haircut for 75 cents at
Angelo's Barber Shop is named Vincent Martinez.
10. Vincent Martinez was then and still is employed by respondent.
11. It took Vincent Martinez less than 15 minutes to give complainant's
son a haircut.
12. Vincent Martinez did not indicate at that time that he found any
particular difficulty in giving complainant's son a haircut.
13. Vincent Martinez made no attempt to charge complainant more than
75 cents for giving her son a haircut.
14. On May 19, 1959 complainant again took her son to Angelo's Barber
Shop for a haircut.
15. On that occasion, respondent told complainant's son he would have
to pay $5 for a haircut.9
And the principal affirmative actions enjoined upon respondent by its
order were the following:
a. Extend to complainant and her son, without regard to their race or
color, full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advantages, facil-
ities and privileges at Angelo's Barber Shop and any other barber shop
operated by respondent within the State of New York, at the regular
rates charged by respondent for accommodating white persons;
b. Extend to all persons, without regard to their race, creed, color or
national origin full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advan-
8 Ibid.
9 State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Mustachio, supra note 6, at 356-57:
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tages, acilities and privileges at Angelo's Barber Shop and any other
barber shop operated by respondent within the State of New York,
at the regular fates charged by respondent for accommodating 'white
persons;
c. Write to the complainant... offering to cut her son's hair at the reg-
ular rate charged by respondent for cutting a white person's hair;
d. Furnish to Negro customers services of the same quality as those fur-
nished to white customers and at the same rates;
f. Instruct all respondent's employees, in writing, to furnish to Negro
customers services of the same quality as those furnished to white
customers and at the same rates .... 10
It appears, therefore, that not only had one of Mustachio's employees
already cut complainant's son's hair on a previous occasion but the only
"involuntary service" which Mustachio was personally obliged to Tender
consisted of writing a letter. Small wonder that the relevance of the
thirteenth amendment was not apparent to the Commission or to the
judge who enforced its order.
Browning v. Slenderella Systems," the Washington case which brought
forth the dissent of that "perceptive jurist" to whose words Mr. Avins
gives over the final page of his article, indicates even more strongly the
irrelevance of the thirteenth amendment to the typical cases arising
under these statutes. A Negro woman, who had made an appointment
by telephone for a courtesy demonstration of the Slenderella treatments,
was kept waiting in the reception room for approximately two hours and
was told by the manager: "We have never served anybody but Cau-
casians and I just know you won't be happy here."' 2 She sued for
damages, alleging "embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish and
emotional shock" resulting from this act of discrimination.' Defendant
conceded that its salon was a "place of public resort, accommodation, as-
semblage, or amusement." 4 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed
a verdict for the plaintiff, but reduced the award of damages from $750
to the "nominal" sum of one hundred dollars.' 5
The only defendant in this case was a corporation. Mr. Avins does
not enlighten us as to whether corporations can be held in involuntary
servitude, having somehow resisted the intellectual temptations that
subject seems to offer. Furthermore, it appears that "a representative of
the defendant called the plaintiff the next day [after her rebuff] to
10 Id. at 359.
11 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
12 Id. at 442, 341 P.2d at 861.
13 Id. at 443, 341 P.2d at 862.
14 Id. at 445, 341 P.2d at 863.
15 Id. at 451, 341 P.2d at 866.
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apologizefor what had happened, and to offer the plaintiff an appoint-
ment .... 1' Such a record hardly seems to call forth the observation of
the "perceptive" dissenting judge that "when a white woman is com-
pelled against her will'to give a negress a Swedish- massage, that .. is
involuntary servitude."" Indeed, the thirteenth amendment argument
appeared only at the conclusion of the dissenter's two-page farrago
against the statute as an 'unconstitutional abrogation of the right of an
operator of a business, allegedly guaranteed by the ninth amendment,
"to discriminate in [his] private affairs upon any conceivable basis." 8
The reality, of course, is that the statutes with which Mr. Avins is
concerned are not regulations of "personal service occupations" but, as
they state on their face, of "'places of public accommodation." The cases
arising under those statutes bear no resemblance to the cases of slavery,
peonage, military service, conscientious objectors, seamen leaving their
ships, and the miscellany of other thirteenth amendment problems that
Mr. Avins has collected. 9 The distinction is that in these "typical" anti-
discrimination cases, the respondent is not required to render personal
services at all; as a condition to his operating a place of public accom-
modation, he is merely required to insure that the facilities of his place
are available to people regardless of their race, creed, color, or national
origin.
It is also noteworthy that in neither of the two cases emphasized by
Mr. Avins does it appear that respondent's regular employees were un-
willing to render the personal services required to make the facilities of the
place available to the complainant. In Mustachio one employee had al-
ready done so on a previdus occasion, and in Slenderella the respondent
was able to assure the complainant of an appointment the next day. What
does appear is that the respondent, for personal or business reasons, did
not want the complainant to enjoy the facilities of his place of public
accommodation, regardless of the willingness or unwillingness of his em-
ployees to render the personal services incidental to that enjoyment.
The frustration of such a purpose does not subject the respondent to
involuntary servitude. Mr. Avins himself recognizes that "the 'involun-
tary servitude' forbidden by the thirteenth amendment applies only to
the rendition of personal labor" and that "the performance of imper-
16 Id. at 449, 341 P.2d at 865.
17 Id. at 456, 341 P.2d at 869.
18 Id. at 455, 341 P.2d at 869.
19 On April 30, 1964, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire rejected the argument that a
State statute prohibiting racial discrimination in places of public accomodation, as applied to
barber shops, subjected the defendant to involuntary servitude within the meaning of the
thirteenth amendment. State v. Sprague, 200 A.2d 206 (N.H. 1964).
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sonal acts, such as giving instructions to a subordinate agent to take
certain action, does not fall within the ambit of the amendment. ' 20 Un-
fortunately, he does not trouble to note the applicability of this exception
to the cases which he believes typify the problem.
But it might be argued that these were merely fortuitous circum-
stances. Mustachio might have had a one-man barber shop, and Slender-
ella might have been an individual masseuse or slenderizer. Would there
then be any reality to the distinction between requiring the facilities of
the place to be made available and requiring the respondent himself (or
herself) to perform personally distasteful services? I think there would.
If the state required that a barber shop maintain certain sanitary stand-
ards, it could not be argued that a barber was forced into involuntary
servitude by being forced to wash out the sink at the pain of losing his
right to barber. He may hire someone else to do.it if he finds the work
distasteful; the state requires only that the work be done. Similarly, if
he finds it personally distasteful to cut the hair of a Negro, then he may
hire someone else to do the cutting.
The case of Thompson v. Commonwealth2' offers a useful analogy.
Defendants had entered into a contract to "prepare, build, construct and
deliver" certain electrical units. Plaintiff obtained a decree ordering
specific performance of the contract on the ground that the equipment
"was not readily available on the open market," even though "the manu-
facture [thereof] did not require any extraordinary or unique skill or
knowledge." On appeal, defendants contended that "the decree . . .
would require the personal attention and labor of two of your defend-
ants for many months and therefore would place them in a position
tantamount to involuntary servitude." The appellate court modified the
decree to require the defendants "to prepare, build, construct and de-
liver or cause to be prepared, built, constructed and delivered" the equip-
ment in issue. Noting defendants' argument in opposition to specific
performance that "any first class machine shop" could build the equip-
ment, the court pointed out that defendants, "if they be so advised ...
may avoid personal services by contracting with one of [such] shops" to
do so.22
But what if there is no other qualified person who can make the facili-
ties of the place available to the complainant, either because everyone
in the area shares the distaste of the respondent for members of the
group to which the complainant belongs, or because the services, to be
effective, require the specialized skill or training of the respondent?
2o Avins, supra note 1, at 236.
21 197 Va. 208, 89 S.E.2d 64 (1955).
22 Id. at 215, 89 S.E.2d at 68. [Emphasis added.]
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In the first situation, the state has still not commanded that the re-
spondent do anything; it has only commanded that the thing be done.
If a barber is unwilling to clean the sink and unable to hire anyone to
clean it, then he must close his barber shop. The fact that he is unable
to hire another to perform a service which by law attaches to the main-
tenance of a place of public accommodation may place him in a difficult
position, but it is not analogous to cases of involuntary servitude, in
which the respondent himself must perform without any right to sub-
stitute the performance of another.
The second situation poses a more difficult question, but it is not a
question which would ordinarily arise under antidiscrimination laws re-
lating to "places of public accommodation." The "typical" case here
would be that of a professional man, perhaps a doctor or a dentist,
uniquely qualified to perform a certain operation or other procedure.
It is hard to see how his refusal personally to perform the procedure
on a certain person because of his race, creed, color, or national origin
would constitute denial of the facilities of a place of public accommoda-
tion. Mr. Avins cites no case to show that the type of antidiscrimination
laws to which he objects has ever been applied to situations of this
nature. Indeed, in one case from California, a state which he lists among
those having "very broad statutes which include almost every con-
ceivable personal service occupation," 23 it was held that a dentist was a
member of a "learned profession," that his office was not a place of
public accommodation, and that he was not required by the statute to
render service to Negroes.24
It is of course possible that some court or administrative agency might
issue an order under a state antidiscrimination law requiring someone
to perform personally services which he would not render voluntarily.
Regardless of the constitutionality of any such order, a strong argument
can be made that it would be bad policy and bad law. But the cases that
Mr. Avins views with such alarm are not that case.
The problems of law and public policy involved in application of anti-
discrimination laws-laws which evoke strong passions and raise diffi-
cult practical questions-deserve and require the earnest study and
analysis of legal scholars as well as of judges and administrators. How-
ever, no constructive purpose is served by invoking a constitutional bo-
geyman to divert attention from real issues, foreclose legitimate areas
of argument, and give a new veneer of plausibility to discarded social and
constitutional theories.
23 Avins, supra note 1, at 228 n.3.
24 Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (Super. Ct. 1957).
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